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The Market in Unmatured Tort 
Claims: Twenty-Five Years Later 
 
Stephen Marks* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In an article in 1989 in the Virginia Law Review, Professor 
Robert Cooter argued for changes in the law that would 
facilitate the development of a market in unmatured tort 
claims.1 An unmatured tort claim is a potential claim that a 
potential victim has before any injury has occurred.2 Cooter 
proposed that potential victims have the right to sell their 
unmatured tort claims.3 That is, Cooter proposed that potential 
victims be allowed to sell their right to sue even before an 
accident or injury ever occurs.4 Even twenty-five years later, 
the proposal remains both bold and imaginative, and yet it 
remains unadopted in any jurisdiction. There is a reason for 
this. In this Article, I reexamine the proposal as to its likely 
intended and unintended effects. The unintended effects were 
overlooked in the original article because of its static analysis. 
A dynamic analysis reveals these unintended effects. These 
effects do not invalidate the proposal. I conclude that Cooter’s 
proposal continues to have merit, but several modifications are 
necessary if the proposal is to succeed. Without these 
modifications, the proposal will fail to accomplish its goals and 
will have serious adverse unintended effects. In short, this 
Article argues for the adoption of measures to permit the 
development of a limited market in unmatured tort claims. The 
primary limitation is the exclusion of potential injurers in the 
market for their own unmatured tort claims. Other 
 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
1. See Robert Cooter, Towards A Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 
VA. L. REV. 383 (1989). 
2. See id. at 383. 
3. See id. 
4. See id. 
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modifications include utilizing a different measure of damages 
and a prohibition on liability limiting agreements. 
 
II. Background and Organization 
 
In this Article we will use the following terms: 
Unmatured Tort Claim: As indicated above, an unmatured 
tort claim is a claim that is based on possible future accidents.5 
Market for Unmatured Tort Claims: This market would 
permit potential victims to sell their potential right to sue to 
others. The buyer of the unmatured tort claim would be able to 
sue the tortfeasor if and when an injury occurred to the victim 
whose tort claim the buyer has purchased.6 If an injury occurs, 
a court may award damages. The amount of damages may be 
measured according to one of the following: 
Full-Compensation Damages: The amount of damages that 
will give the victim the same amount of utility whether or not 
the injury occurs.7 
Optimal-Insurance Damages: The amount of damages that 
will give the victim the maximum expected utility over injury 
and no-injury states given the probability of injury.8 
Optimal-Deterrence Damages: The amount of damages that 
will induce the potential injurer to adopt the optimal level of 
care, where the optimal level of care is that which produces the 
maximum amount of expected utility over injury and no-injury 
states. (Again, this expected utility is just the product of the 
probability of no accident and the utility if there is no injury 
plus product of the probability of an injury and the utility if 
there is an injury.)9 
Optimal-insurance damages may be lower than full-
compensation damages.10 This is the primary motivating factor 
 
5. See id. 
6. See id. 
7. See id. at 394 (defining “ideal insurance”). 
8. See id. at 396 (comparing “ideal insurance” with “ideal 
compensation”). This expected utility is just the product of the probability of 
no injury and the utility if there is no injury plus the product of the 
probability of an injury and the utility if there is an injury. 
9. See id. at 398-400. 
10. An early and influential article in this area is Philip J. Cook & 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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in Cooter’s proposal for a market in unmatured tort claims. By 
allowing potential victims to sell their claims to full 
compensation, they can purchase optimal insurance.11 
Meanwhile, potential tortfeasors will be deterred since holders 
of the claims will be able to sue for full compensation.12 The 
result, according to Cooter’s analysis, would be both optimal 
deterrence and optimal insurance. There would be additional 
advantages to such a market. Since, under Cooter’s proposal, 
potential tortfeasors could purchase the unmatured tort claims 
of their potential victims, transaction costs of negotiation and 
suit would be reduced since such potential tortfeasors would 
not sue themselves.13 Also, socially optimal institutional 
arrangements would develop naturally through the market 
rather than be determined through the political process. For 
example, drivers could sell their rights to their insurer. The 
insurer could then waive these claims in an agreement with 
other insurers.14 The result would be a system of no-fault 
insurance.15 
Given the potential advantages of a market for unmatured 
tort claims, it is important to examine whether such a market 
will develop and the possible consequences if it does not. I show 
in this Article that the inclusion of potential tortfeasors in the 
market will effectively kill the market. Furthermore, incentives 
for optimal care by potential tortfeasors will disappear if 
potential tortfeasors are allowed to purchase the claims of their 
potential victims. These results are driven by moral hazard. 
That is, potential tortfeasors will act differently with and 
without the rights. Cooter suggests that the market will 
eliminate the moral hazard problem and thus the incentives for 
potential tortfeasors to adopt optimal care will remain intact.16 
I show that rather than the market eliminating the moral 
 
Daniel A Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection:  The Case of 
Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q. J. ECON. 143, 151 (1977) (showing that full 
compensation generally over-insures and over-deters). 
11. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 384. 
12. See id. at 387 (assuming that full compensation is optimal for 
deterrence). 
13. See id. at 407. 
14. See id. at 385. 
15. See id. 
16. See id. at 393. 
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hazard problem, the moral hazard problem will kill the market 
unless potential tortfeasors are excluded. This effect becomes 
apparent when one introduces a time element into the analysis. 
It is true that excluding potential tortfeasors from the 
market may eliminate some of the transaction cost savings that 
could be realized if potential tortfeasors can buy the rights of 
their potential victims, given that in that case potential 
torfeasors would not sue themselves. Still, there may remain 
other significant transaction costs savings. For example, third-
party insurers could buy the claims and then agree not to sue 
each other. Furthermore, other advantages remain. Primary 
among these is the ability to have optimal deterrence and 
optimal insurance. 
Here is how the rest of the Article is organized: 
Section III provides an example that demonstrates the 
relationship among full compensation, optimal insurance, and 
optimal deterrence. Full compensation may both over-insure 
and over-deter. Therefore, Cooter’s proposal must be modified 
so that unmatured tort claims give a right to optimal-
deterrence damages rather than to full-compensation damages. 
Because the optimal deterrence and optimal insurance 
measures of damages differ, the market for unmatured tort 
claims still may function to provide optimal deterrence and 
optimal insurance as Cooter suggests. 
Section IV demonstrates how inclusion of potential 
tortfeasors in the market for unmatured tort claims will 
effectively kill that market and lead to suboptimal precaution. 
Thus, potential tortfeasors must be excluded in order for the 
market to develop and to accomplish its purpose. 
Section V demonstrates that agreements between potential 
tortfeasors and the holders of unmatured claims could lead to 
suboptimal results. Effectively, allowing such agreements 
would allow potential tortfeasors to accomplish indirectly, that 
which they could not accomplish directly under the above 
modifications. Thus, the proposal must be modified to prohibit 
liability-limiting agreements. 
 
 
 
 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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III. Full Compensation, Optimal Deterrence, and Optimal 
Insurance 
 
In what follows, we define and examine three measures of 
damages: full-compensation damages, optimal-insurance 
damages, and optimal-deterrence damages. Let us start by 
considering a product that can cause injury. Suppose for now 
that the potential tortfeasor, a manufacturer, will pay to the 
victim compensation if the product injures the victim. Both the 
cost of production and expected damages will be reflected in the 
price of the product. The product gives the victim a certain 
amount of utility that depends on price and on whether the 
victim gets injured. 
A numerical example will demonstrate the principles. We 
begin by assuming that the potential victim (let us call this 
person K) is risk averse (has diminishing marginal utility of 
wealth)17 and has the expected utilities of wealth given in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
 
 
Wealth 
($) 
 
Utility with 
no Product 
(utils) 
Utility with 
Product and 
no Injury 
(utils) 
Utility with 
Product and 
Injury 
(utils) 
 
 850 145 165 -450  
 860 150 170 -440  
 870 154 174 -432  
 880 157 177 -426  
 890 159 179 -422`  
 900 160 180 -420  
 . 
. 
1000 
. 
. 
3870 
. 
. 
. 
. 
164 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
184 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
-402 
. 
. 
-26 
. 
. 
 
 5850 215 235 165  
      
 
17. 861-1st TAX MGMT. (BNA) ESTATES, GIFTS, & TRUSTS, at A-3 (2013). 
5
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Now suppose that K begins with a wealth of $1000 and 
suppose (for now) that there is a no-liability rule (the consumer 
bears all of the risk) and that the risk of injury is 1%. Suppose 
that the product costs $100 to purchase. Under these facts, K 
will purchase the product. Purchasing the product will 
decrease the consumer’s wealth by $100, from $1000 to $900, 
but total utility will increase from 164 to 174. (See Table 2.) 
 
 Table 2 
Expected Utilities with No Compensation 
 
 
 
 
Prob 
Initial 
Wealth 
less 
Amt 
Spent 
on 
Product 
Wealth 
After 
Purchase Utility 
Total 
Expected 
Utility 
 
 Do not 
purchase 
Product 
No 
Injury 
1.0 $1000 0 $1000 164 164 
 
 
Purchase 
Product 
No 
Injury 
.99 $1000 $100 $900 180 
17418 
 
 
Injury .01 $1000 $100 $900 -420 
 
          
 
A. Full Compensation and Optimal Insurance 
 
Full compensation makes the victim whole, that is, gives 
the victim the same utility whether or not the accident occurs. 
In our example, full compensation is $5000. To see this, assume 
that if K is injured, then K receives $5000. As such, potential 
injurers (such as the manufacturers of products) must pay 
$5000 with a probability of 1%. This is an expected cost of $50 
 
18. This is (180 x .99) + (-420 x .01) = 174. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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that is passed on to consumers, that is, to K. Thus the price of 
the product will increase to $150 so that, if the product is 
purchased and no injury occurs, the consumers’ wealth will be 
$850. If an accident occurs, the consumer will receive $5000 
and have a total wealth of $5850. In either case, total utility 
will be 165, which is what is meant by full compensation. (See 
Table 3.) 
 
Table 3 
Utilities with Full Compensation 
 
 
 
Initial 
Wealth 
less Amt 
Spent on 
Product 
plus 
Damages 
Received 
Final 
Wealth 
Total 
Utility 
Purchase 
product 
No Injury 1000 150 0 850 165 
Injury 1000 150 5000 5850 165 
 
We should note two things: (1) K’s utility is still higher 
from purchasing the product than from not purchasing the 
product. (Recall that the utility from not purchasing the 
product is 164. See Table 2.) However, with slightly different 
numbers (suppose the utility of $1000 wealth without the 
product were 166), full compensation could lead to the product 
not being purchased. (2) The consumer’s utility is lower than in 
a regime where there is no liability. (With no liability, the 
expected utility was 174. Again, see Table 2.) 
Thus, providing full-compensation damages lowers 
expected utility as compared to a no-liability rule. This is not to 
say that a no-liability rule is optimal. Rather, this 
demonstrates that full-compensation insurance does not 
necessarily maximize utility. It is possible that some level of 
insurance, short of full-compensation insurance, maximizes 
utility. 
 
 
7
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B. Full Compensation and Optimal Deterrence 
 
That optimal deterrence and full compensation differ is 
well known in extreme circumstances.19 Calculations for the 
value of a life from risk-taking activity (so-called hedonic 
damages) reflect the realization that optimal deterrence 
requires a payment that is below full compensation. In the case 
of death, full compensation implies an infinite payment. But 
this is true of many traumatic injuries. For example, there is 
probably no sum of money that would compensate most people 
for quadriplegia. Yet there is some finite level of damages that 
will induce the potential tortfeasor to adopt the optimal level of 
care. Hedonic damages for death and other risk-based 
assessments of injuries are attempts to get optimal deterrence, 
not full compensation (which is impossible in these cases) or 
even optimal insurance.20 For example, hedonic damages for 
death are positive and finite even though the victim cannot be 
made whole and even if the victim would not have insured 
against death. The same is true in less extreme cases. 
Let us turn back to our example. So far we have considered 
a product whose probability of causing injury is fixed. Suppose, 
however, that the producer could take more care and that more 
care reduces the probability of injury. Suppose, for example, 
that some costly technology exists for reducing the probability 
of an accident to zero. Suppose that this technology costs $40. 
Suppose again that there is a full compensation rule, which 
means that if an accident happens, the manufacturer must pay 
$5000 to the victim. A manufacturer then has the choice of 
paying $40 to prevent the accident or paying $5000 whenever 
the accident occurs. The latter option has an expected cost of 
$50, since the probability of an accident without care is 0.1. 
Thus, the manufacturer will pay $40 to prevent the accident 
and factor the cost into the price of products. This means that 
the price of the product will be $140, that K’s wealth after 
purchase will be $860, and that the injury will not happen. 
 
19. See Patricia Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in 
Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 520-21 (1984). 
20. In this sense, hedonic damages are misnamed since 'hedonic' evokes 
thoughts of lost pleasure. See Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. 
Ill. 1985), rev’d, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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Total utility will be 170. (See Table 4.) 
 
Table 4 
Utility with Full Compensation and $40 Cost of Care 
 
 
Initial 
Wealth 
Amount Spent 
on Product 
Final Wealth Total Utility 
Purchase 
product 
(injury does 
not occur) 
$1000 $140 $860 170 
 
This is worse than if there are no damages. In the case of 
no damages, the potential injurer does not take care, the 
consumer purchases the product, and the consumer has an 
expected utility of 174. (See Table 2.) Thus, a full compensation 
liability rule will cause the manufacturer to buy $40 of 
prevention, with a resultant expected utility for the consumer 
of 170, while a no liability rule will result in no care with a 
resultant expected utility for the consumer of 174. Clearly, a 
full-compensation liability rule over-deters. 
The notion that full-compensation provides too great a 
level of deterrent effect fuels some discussions about tort 
reform.21 For example, in the medical profession there is 
concern about excessive testing. In the small aircraft industry, 
excessive precaution may lead to prices that few can afford. 
Even though full compensation can over-deter, this does 
not mean that zero compensation is optimal. Suppose that the 
level of compensation was set at $3000 rather than $5000. This 
would mean that a manufacturer would employ a means of 
prevention if it costs less than $30, but would not employ it if it 
cost more than $30. (This is because its expected liability 
without the means of prevention is $30, that is, a 1% chance of 
$3000.) Thus, the manufacturer would not employ a means of 
prevention that cost $40. Suppose the means of prevention cost 
$20. Then the manufacturer would employ it. The cost would 
be reflected in the price of the product and the consumer’s 
wealth would be reduced to $880. With a wealth of $880, the 
 
21. See Cook & Graham, supra note 10, at 155. 
9
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consumer has a utility of 177 (see Table 1) which is better than 
174. 
 
Table 5 
Utility with $3000 Compensation and $20 Cost of Care 
 
Initial 
Wealth 
Amount Spent 
on Product 
Final Wealth 
Total Utility 
Purchase 
product 
(injury does 
not occur) 
$1000 $120 $880 177 
 
C. Optimal Deterrence and Optimal Insurance 
 
So we know that full-compensation damages may over-
deter and provide too much insurance.22 It also turns out that 
optimal-deterrence damages may provide too much insurance.23 
To see this, let us suppose that the damages for optimal-
deterrence are $3000. Suppose that the only possibility is for 
the manufacturer to pay $40 for care that reduces probability 
to zero. In such a case the manufacture will not adopt care. The 
price of the product will be set at $130, reflecting production 
costs and damages. If the consumer purchases the product then 
the expected utility will be, in our model, 172 utils. (See Table 
6.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 396. 
23. See id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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Table 6 
Expected Utility with $3000 Damages 
 
 
Prob 
Initial 
Wealth 
less 
Amt 
Spent 
on 
Product Damages 
Wealth 
After 
Purchase 
Price 
and 
Damages Utility 
Total 
Expected 
Utility 
Purchase 
Product 
No 
Injury 
.99 $1000 $130 0 $870 174 
172 
Injury .01 $1000 $130 3000 $3870 -26 
 
One hundred seventy-two utils. is still a worse result than 
if there were no damages. The damages in this case do not 
optimally insure. (In terms of insurance, no damages is better 
than this level of damages.) Yet we want to give the 
manufacturer the incentive to adopt care when it is efficient to 
do so, because if the cost of care drops, say to $20, then the 
consumer is better off with the producer adopting care. (Recall 
that with a cost of care at $20, the utility that the consumer 
gets is 177.) In general, full-compensation damages will be 
greater than or equal to optimal-deterrence damages, and 
optimal-deterrence damages will be greater than or equal to 
optimal-insurance damages.24 
 
D. The Market for Unmatured Tort Claims 
 
How do we get both optimal deterrence and optimal 
insurance? Cooter’s model suggests that the courts grant full-
compensation damages, but that the potential victim be 
permitted to sell the right to collect these damages to others.25 
These others can then sue the tortfeasor.26 The potential 
victims can then buy optimal insurance.27 As we have 
 
24. See Cook & Graham, supra note 10, at 144. 
25. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 385. 
26. See id. 
27. See id. at 387. 
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demonstrated above, full-compensation damages can lead to 
over-deterrence. Still, Cooter’s point is well-taken. We can 
modify Cooter’s proposal as follows: 
 
Modification 1:  Courts should award optimal-
deterrence damages (rather than full-
compensation damages). 
 
Potential victims would be allowed to sell the right to these 
damages to others, and they could afford to buy optimal 
insurance. This will result in optimal-deterrence and optimal 
insurance. However, as will be shown in the following sections, 
additional modifications are necessary. 
 
IV. Why the Market Must Exclude Potential Tortfeasors 
 
In Cooter’s proposal, potential tortfeasors would be allowed 
to purchase unmatured tort claims from their potential 
victims.28 This would give additional advantages by eliminating 
significant transaction costs involved in negotiation and 
litigation, since tortfeasors would never sue themselves. 
In this section, I show that a market for unmatured tort 
claims will develop only if potential tortfeasors are prohibited 
from purchasing the claims of their potential victims. Potential 
tortfeasors who hold unmatured tort claims related to their 
own torts, will engage in socially suboptimal behavior due to 
moral hazard. Cooter argued that moral hazard will be 
corrected by the market.29 I make the opposite argument; 
Moral hazard will not be corrected by the market. Rather, 
moral hazard will destroy the market.30 If tortfeasors are not 
prohibited from buying unmatured tort claims from their 
victims, there will be insufficient incentives for optimal 
precaution even if courts award optimal-deterrence damages. 
The reason to suspect that a secondary market will never 
develop is that potential tortfeasors are always in a better 
position than other secondary buyers to purchase unmatured 
 
28. See id. at 385. 
29. See id. at 393. 
30. See Patricia Danzon, supra note 19, at 522-25. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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tort claims due to moral hazard and transaction costs. 
Unmatured tort claims are always more valuable to the 
tortfeasor than to anyone else. The problem is exacerbated by 
other types strategic behavior as well.31 The problem may be 
mitigated through compulsory insurance, but it is not solved.32 
This is demonstrated below. 
 
A. The Contingency of Behavior 
 
What level of care will a potential tortfeasor adopt? The 
answer is: it depends. This answer is so important to the 
following discussion that it is useful to take a few moments and 
ponder what it means. 
An unmatured tort claim represents a right to sue the 
tortfeasor for any accident that occurs within a specified time 
period.33 Suppose that such a tort claim is sold on January 1, 
2015 and that it has a duration of one year. How much care 
will be adopted during the 2015 year? It depends on whether 
the potential injurer owns the unmatured tort claim or if 
someone else does. We can call this the contingent behavior 
principle: 
 Contingent Behavior Principle. The behavior of the 
potential injurer is flexible. In particular, the behavior 
of the potential injurer can differ depending on who 
owns the unmatured tort claim. 
The importance of the contingent behavior assumption is 
its interaction with value. The value of the above unmatured 
tort claim on January 1, 2015, depends on the expected 
behavior of the potential injurer in 2015. We can call this the 
contingent value principle. 
Contingent Value Principle. The value of the 
unmatured tort claim depends on the expected behavior 
of the potential injurer during the actual period of the 
unmatured tort claim. 
The two principles together imply that value is contingent 
on who owns the tort claim. 
 
31. See Cooter, surpa note 1, at 404 
32. See Danzon, supra note 19, at 518-22. 
33. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 383. 
13
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B. An Example 
 
Let us consider a very simple situation. Suppose that there 
are four possible levels of care (including zero) that a potential 
injurer can adopt. The injury is one in which the victim suffers 
some loss. The probabilities of injury and the costs of care are 
given in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
Units of Care Cost of Care Probability of Injury 
0 0 .06 
1 15 .03 
2 30 .01 
3 45 0 
 
Let us suppose that the level of care that is socially 
optimal is 2 units and that the optimal-deterrence damages are 
$1000. These two assumptions are consistent since $1000 
damages will induce the potential injurer to adopt 2 units of 
care. This can be seen in Table 8.34 
 
34. Anything between $750 and $1500, noninclusive, would do. However, 
I chose $1000 because it is also optimal if we allow fractional levels of care. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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Table 8 
Units of 
Care 
Cost of Care 
Probability 
of Injury 
Expected 
Liability 
Expected 
Private Cost 
0 0 .06 60 60 
1 15 .03 30 45 
2 30 .01 10 40 
3 45 0 0 45 
 
Let us also assume that the level of optimal damages from 
an insurance standpoint is $600. Thus, the ideal outcome 
would be for the potential injurer to adopt 2 units of care and 
for the potential victim to receive $600 every time an injury 
occurs. Unfortunately, a simple damage rule of $600 will not 
provide the proper deterrence. With damages of $600 the 
private payoffs are given in Table 9. 
  
Table 9 
Units of 
Care 
Cost of Care 
Probability 
of Injury 
Expected 
Liability 
Expected 
Private Cost 
0 0 .06 36 36 
1 15 .03 18 33 
2 30 .01 6 36 
3 45 0 0 45 
 
Thus, with damages of $600 the potential injurer will 
adopt 1 unit of care. The probability of an accident will be 3 
times higher than the optimal level (that is, .03 rather than 
.01). 
A market for unmatured tort claims allows potential 
victims to sell their claims. For example, a potential injurer 
could sell an unmatured claim to a third party for $10. Such a 
claim would give the holder a right to bring an action for 
15
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optimal-deterrence damages against the tortfeasor. That is, the 
third party would bring an action against the potential injurer 
for $1000 whenever there was an injury. This would give the 
potential tortfeasor the incentive to adopt 2 units of care; the 
optimum and the resultant probability of an accident would be 
.01. The potential victim could then buy $600 worth of 
insurance for $6 and would pocket the remaining $4. Both the 
third party and the insurer break-even since the probability of 
an accident will be .01 under these conditions, resulting in both 
optimal deterrence and optimal insurance. 
In Cooter’s proposal, however, the potential injurer will 
also be able to bid for the unmatured tort claim.35 In this case, 
there would be the additional advantage of transaction costs 
savings since the potential injurer would not sue himself or 
herself. Unfortunately, the entry of the potential injurer into 
the market for unmatured tort claims will destroy the market 
and also destroy the incentives for optimal care. To see why 
this result comes about we must look at pricing. 
 
C. Parties to the Transaction 
 
There are three different types of parties: the potential 
victims, the potential injurer, and the potential third party 
purchasers.36 The potential victim sells the tort claim.37 
Potential buyers include the potential injurer and potential 
third party purchasers.38 
 
D. Pricing 
 
We begin our discussion by inquiring how much a potential 
third party purchaser would be willing to pay for an 
unmatured tort claim. The potential third-party purchaser 
realizes that if the claim is purchased and enforced, the 
potential injurer will have an incentive to adopt two units of 
 
35. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 383-84. 
36. See id. at 384-85. 
37. See id. 
38. See id. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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care.39 The probability of injury will then be .01 yielding an 
expected liability of $10. Thus, the most a potential third party 
purchaser will be willing to pay is $10. 
How much will the potential injurer be willing to pay? The 
potential injurer would think of the calculation in the following 
terms, “If I purchase the claim and adopt zero units of care, 
then my costs are just the price of the claim, since I will not sue 
myself. If I do not purchase the claim, then I have private costs 
of $40.” (See Table 8.) Thus, the potential injurer is willing to 
pay up to $40 for the claim.40 
Suppose that the potential injurer makes a bid of $11, 
wins, and adopts zero units of care in 2015. Now, assume that 
potential third party purchasers observe that in 2015 the 
accident rate is 6%, and they reason that if they had the claim 
it would be worth $60, that is $1000 times .06. Based on this 
reasoning, on January 1, 2016, a potential third party 
purchaser bids $50 and wins the claim. The potential injurer 
immediately adjusts for this liability exposure and adopts two 
units of care. In 2016, the third party purchaser collects only 
$10. Of course, it is unlikely that a sophisticated third party 
purchaser would make such a mistake, but surely it would not 
do so twice. The following year the potential injurer again bids 
$11 and is uncontested. 
The results are that (1) only potential tortfeasors will be in 
the market for their own unmatured tort claims and (2) the 
potential injurer will adopt a suboptimal level of care. 
 
E. Insurance 
 
Under some arrangements, the presence of insurance can 
mitigate the incentive problem, but cannot solve it. Let us look 
at pricing in this case. 
In order to see the effects of insurance, let us start with a 
simple example. Suppose that the purchaser of the unmatured 
tort claim is required to provide the optimal level of insurance, 
in this case $600, to the potential victim. Let us call this a 
bundled claim. In this case, the third party purchaser would 
 
39. See id. at 385. 
40. See supra Table 9, for the referenced calculation. 
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have the right to collect $1000 from the potential injurer 
whenever there was an accident but it would have to pay $600 
to the victim. Thus, the third party purchaser would collect 
$400 for every accident. Under such circumstances, the third 
party purchaser knows that the potential injurer will have the 
incentive to adopt two units of care. Thus, the probability of an 
accident would be .01 and the claim would be worth $4 to the 
purchaser. 
Suppose that the potential injurer also offers to buy a 
bundled claim. With the bundled claim, the potential injurer 
must pay $600 whenever there is an accident. The potential 
injurer will thus adopt one unit of care. (See Table 9.) The cost 
to the potential injurer will be $33. Without the tort claim, the 
potential injurer will face $1000 in liability per accident and 
will adopt two units of care. The cost will be $40. Thus, the 
potential injurer will be willing to pay up to $7 for the bundled 
claim. 
The third-party purchaser is willing to pay up to $4 for this 
bundled claim. The potential injurer is willing to pay up to $7. 
Suppose that the potential injurer makes a bid of $5, wins, and 
adopts one unit of care in 2015. Now suppose that potential 
third-party purchasers observe that in 2015 the accident rate is 
3%. Suppose they reason that if they had the claim they would 
have collected $12, that is $400 times .03. Based on this 
reasoning, on January 1, 2016, a potential third-party 
purchaser bids $8 and wins the claim. The potential injurer 
immediately adjusts for this liability exposure and adopts two 
units of care. In 2016, the third-party purchaser collects only 
$4. Again, it is unlikely that a sophisticated third-party 
purchaser would make the mistake of bidding over $4, but 
surely it would not do so twice. The next year the potential 
injurer again bids $5 and is uncontested. The potential injurer 
adopts one unit of care. This is suboptimal. 
 
F. Exacerbating Considerations 
 
In addition to the above advantages (due to moral hazard), 
the tortfeasor has additional advantages in terms of 
transaction costs and information. That is, the tortfeasor saves 
on considerable transaction costs of post-accident bargaining, 
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settlement and trial.41 Furthermore, the potential tortfeasor 
has information on precautionary technology and accident 
rates that are unavailable to others in the secondary market. 
In some senses, avoiding transaction costs is socially good, so 
long as doing so does not have other adverse consequences. In 
the case of unmatured tort claims, these advantages help to 
drive non-potential tortfeasors from the market and result in 
poor incentives for care. One additional effect of the possible 
asymmetry of information is that outside bidders would suffer 
from winner’s curse problems42. This makes it even less likely 
that a secondary market will develop. 
Finally, if we add strategic behavior to our model, the 
possibility exists for extremely low pricing and no secondary 
market. That is, the potential tortfeasor may offer to buy the 
unmatured tort claim at an extremely low price with an 
additional conditional offer to beat any competitors offer by, 
say, 10 percent. Given the transaction costs that are entailed in 
valuing an unmatured tort claim, the incentives of any 
secondary buyer to conduct such a valuation disappear in the 
face of such an offer. Thus, the price that a potential tortfeasor 
will be able to set will be limited only by the information and 
bargaining power of the sellers. Neither information nor 
bargaining power of sellers (for example, of employees) are 
likely to be great. The result is that potential tortfeasors would 
be seriously underdeterred. 
 
G. Excluding Potential Tortfeasors 
 
The above discussion indicates that the unmatured tort 
claim will end up in the hands of the potential injurer and that 
the potential injurer will adopt a suboptimal level of care. It 
also indicates that no active market will ever develop. 
 
41. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 407. 
42. The winner's curse refers to the phenomenon in which bidders are 
uncertain about the true value of the "item" put up for bid. In such a case, the 
winner of the auction is likely to be a bidder that has overestimated. Thus, by 
winning, the winner loses. Experienced bidders compensate for the winner's 
curse by lowering their bids. See WILLIAM SAMUELSON & STEPHEN MARKS, 
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS, SEVENTH EDITION (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011), 
for a discussion of the winner’s curse. 
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Nevertheless, a market for unmatured tort claims can 
accomplish its goal of optimal insurance and optimal 
deterrence if potential injurers are excluded from the market: 
 
Modification 2: Potential tortfeasors should not 
be able to purchase unmatured tort claims from 
their potential victims. 
 
In such a case, the tort claim will end up in the hands of 
third-party purchasers who will enforce the claims against 
potential injurers.43 Accordingly, potential injurers will adopt 
the optimal level of care and potential victims will be able to 
obtain optimal insurance.44 In short, in order for a market in 
unmatured tort claims to accomplish its twin goals of optimal 
insurance and optimal deterrence, potential tortfeasors must 
not be allowed to purchase the claims of their potential 
victims.45 
 
V. Liability-Limiting Agreements 
 
The next issue involves liability-limiting agreements 
between the holders of the claims and the potential tortfeasors. 
Consider the case of an insurance company that provides 
insurance to the employees and that has purchased the claims 
(as part of an insurance package) from employees. It should be 
clear from the above discussion that the employer could afford 
to pay the insurer a fee not to enforce the full extent of the 
claims. For example, the employer could offer the insurance 
company a fee in exchange for limiting the damages to $600. In 
this case, the employer could reduce caution to one unit. The 
maximum fee that the employer could offer for this is $7 since 
this is the amount it would save. Such an agreement would cost 
the insurer $4. This is calculated as follows. The insurance 
 
43. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 395. 
44. See id. at 399. 
45. Those who believe that the tort law has developed along efficient 
lines will be encouraged by the consistency of the above reasoning with 
developments in the early nineteenth century when courts invalidated 
waivers of liability as against public policy. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 386 
n.7, for examples of such cases. 
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company would collect more damages since it would be 
collecting $18 (3% of $600) rather than $10 (1% of $1000) for a 
gain of $8. However, it would also be paying out $18 (3% of 
$600) rather than $6 (1% of $600) for a loss of $12. On net, it 
loses $4 so it will require a fee of at least $4. Thus, a mutually 
advantageous deal could be struck. The fee would be greater 
than $4 and lower than $7. The potential injurer would adopt 
one unit of care. 
In short, if we allow liability-limiting agreements between 
holders of claims and the potential tortfeasor, we would get 
similar results to those that we would get by letting potential 
tortfeasors in the market. In particular, we would get 
insufficient incentives for care. Hence, our last modification: 
 
Modification 3: Potential tortfeasors should not 
be able to enter into liability-limiting agreements 
with the holders of unmatured tort claims. 
 
With these three modifications, the market for unmatured 
tort claims could produce optimal deterrence and optimal 
insurance. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
The above discussion in no way strikes at the heart of the 
argument for a market in unmatured tort claims. Rather, it 
suggests that, in order to accomplish its goals, three 
modifications are necessary. First, the claims must be based on 
optimal-deterrence damages rather than full-compensation 
damages. Second, potential tortfeasors must not be allowed to 
purchase the claims of their potential victims. Third, 
agreements between potential tortfeasors and the holders of 
unmatured tort claims must be prohibited. 
Of course, this will not end debate on this issue. The 
market for unmatured tort claims, as modified, will accomplish 
the goal of optimal deterrence and optimal insurance only if we 
determine the size of optimal deterrence awards. There have 
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been some attempts to do this46, but the discussion must 
continue. Furthermore, while the modified market for 
unmatured tort claims can produce both optimal deterrence 
and optimal insurance, it does not eliminate transaction costs 
of the tort system. Thus, it must be compared to, or considered 
in conjunction with, proposals that might mitigate transaction 
costs. Nevertheless, it is time to give the market for unmatured 
tort claims another look. 
 
46. See Danzon, supra note 19, at 517. 
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Technical Appendix 
 
Over-deterrence 
In this section, Cooter’s model of a wealth-neutral accident 
is used to demonstrate mathematically the problem of over-
deterrence.47 The problem of over-deterrence can be seen using 
the model that Cooter provided. Suppose that a consumer 
purchases a good for a price of s and that the good produces a 
utility of U(w-s), where w means wealth, if it causes no injury 
and V(w-s) if it injures the consumer. The probability of injury 
is p. The consumer has an expected utility equal to: 
 
(1-p)U(w-s) + pV(w-s). 
  
First, as an aside, let us replicate Cooter’s argument that 
full compensation overcompensates.48 To do this, we allow the 
consumer to purchase perfectly fair insurance. 
 
(1-p)U(w-s-pA) + pV(w-s-pA+A). 
 
A is the amount of insurance purchased and pA is the 
premium. Now suppose that V = U-k. That is, the accident 
shifts the utility function downward. This is Cooter’s wealth-
neutral accident. The above expression becomes: 
 
(1-p)U(w-s -pA) + pU(w-s-pA+A) - pk                                 (1) 
 
If we maximize this expression over A, to determine the 
amount of insurance that the consumer will choose, and if we 
simplify, we get the following first order expression: 
 
U’(w-s-pA) = U’(w-s-pA+A) 
 
which is fulfilled only if A is zero. That is, the consumer will 
choose not to insure. As Cooter points out, in this case, the 
potential victim will not want to insure since marginal utility is 
 
47. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 388-91. 
48. See id. at 384. 
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unaffected by the accident even though total utility falls.49 In 
this case, any compensation is overcompensation.50 
I will show that in this type of wealth-neutral accident, full 
compensation also produces over-deterrence. First note that if 
A=0 then expression (1) becomes: 
 
U(w-s) - pk. 
 
The producer produces the good. For simplicity, suppose 
that the only expense in producing the good is care, c. The 
probability of an accident is a function of the level of care, c. 
The probability decreases as c increases, but at a decreasing 
rate. (We say that p’ is negative and p” is positive.) Suppose 
that the producer is in perfect competition and that there is 
Coasian51 bargaining. In this case, profits will be bid to zero, 
that is, c=s. Furthermore, utility will be maximized. That is, we 
maximize the following expression: 
 
U(w-c) - p(c)k. 
 
Notice that in perfect competition the consumer will pay a 
price of s=c. Thus, the consumer balances price and safety. The 
optimal c is chosen so that the first order condition is zero: 
 
U’(w-c*) + p’(c*)k = 0. 
 
Now let us remove the assumption of Coasian52 bargaining 
and replace it with a damage rule that requires the producer to 
pay damages of d whenever there is an accident. Let us make 
this a full compensation rule53 so that 
 
U(w-c*+d) - k = U(w-c*) 
 
 
49. See id. at 392. 
50. See Cooter, supra note 1, for an especially clear explanation of this. 
51. See Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory, 28 
VAL. U. L. REV. 919, 926 (1994). 
52. See id. 
53. See supra Section II (defining full-compensation damages). 
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which is to say that utilities in the accident state and non-
accident state are equated. Dividing through by d and 
rearranging a bit we get the equality in the following 
expression: 
 
{U(w-c*+d) - U(w-c*)}/d = k/d < U’(w-c*). 
 
The inequality comes from the fact that the expression to 
the left of the equality is the slope of a line connecting w-c* and 
w-c*+d on the utility function and U’(w-c*) is the slope of the 
tangent at w-c*. Because of risk aversion, the utility function is 
concave and the tangent has a greater slope. If we substitute 
k/d into expression (1) above we get: 
 
k/d + p’(c*)k < 0 or, equivalently 
1 + p’(c*)d < 0. 
 
Note that the producer will want to maximize profit s-c-
p(c)d. (Remember that s is fixed by market since the firm is a 
price-taker.) The producer will choose a c** so that the first 
order condition is satisfied: 
 
1 + p’(c**)d = 0. 
 
Finally, recall that p’ is negative but becomes less negative 
as c increases due to diminishing marginal returns. (That is, p” 
is positive.) This implies that the expression 1+p’(c)d is 
increasing in c and that c** is greater than c*. Thus, the 
producer is over-deterred. 
 
The Market for Unmatured Tort Claims54 
 
Consider an employer who must pay for safety. Cost of 
safety is c. The probability of an accident p(c) where p falls with 
c, but at a decreasing rate due to diminishing marginal returns 
to safety. If an accident happens D is paid, where D is the 
optimal deterrence level of damages. (I am assuming that we 
 
54. See generally Cooter, supra note 1. 
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have made the modification suggested in the previous section.) 
The optimal level of care is, by definition, the amount that 
minimizes: 
 
c + p(c)D. 
 
The value that minimizes the above expression, that is, the 
optimal level of care, is cd. In the following examples we 
assume that the secondary market for unmatured tort claims is 
unrestricted. That is, potential tortfeasors can buy the claims 
of their potential victims. 
First, for simplicity, consider the case where there is no 
insurance. There are two possibilities. Either the employer 
purchases the unmatured tort claims and the employers costs 
are c + t, where t is purchase price of the claims,  or, others 
purchase the claims and enforce them in court. In this case, the 
expected costs to the potential injurer are c + p(c)D. In the first 
case, the employer has no liability and no incentive to adopt 
care and sets c to zero. In the second case, c is set to cd. In 
other words, the action of the employer is conditional whether 
the employer wins the bid. This is true even if the rights must 
be purchased yearly. 
How much will the employer be willing to pay for the 
rights? To find the answer we subtract the cost with the rights, 
t, from the cost without the rights cd + p(cd)D. The difference is 
cd + p(cd)D - t. 
The employer is willing to pay up to cd + p(cd)D for the 
rights. Suppose that the employer has a standing offer to 
purchase the rights for [0.5cd + p(cd)D]. Since the rights are 
only worth p(cd)D to an outsider, the employer will always win 
the bid. The employer will also adopt zero level of care. Again, 
note that the rights will not be worth p(0)D to an outsider 
because as soon as an outsider wins the bid, the employer will 
optimize by adopting cd. This dramatic example shows that not 
only will a secondary market not develop, but also that the 
effects on care level could be drastic in terms of deterrence. 
Does insurance fix this? Suppose the employer provides 
insurance to all employees. In the case of an accident the 
insurance pays I. I is less than D reflecting the notion that 
optimal insurance is less than optimal deterrence damages. 
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Now we have the following costs: 
 
ci + p(ci)I + t            if the employer buys the rights, and 
cx + p(cx)I + p(cx)D if someone else buys the rights. 
 
We have chosen ci to minimize c + p(c)I  and cx to 
minimize c + p(c)I + p(c)D. In neither case does the employer 
adopt cd. Furthermore, we can again show that a secondary 
market will not develop. The difference between the two 
expressions is: 
 
{[cx + p(cx)I] - [ci + p(ci)I]} + p(cx)D - t. 
 
The expression in the brackets {} is positive since ci 
minimizes c + p(c)I. Again, we can imagine a standing offer by 
the employer of, say, 
 
0.5{[cx + p(cx)I] - [ci + p(ci)I]} + p(cx)D. 
 
Given this offer, the employer would always win the bid, 
since it is worth at most p(cx)D to an outsider. Furthermore, 
the employer would end up adopting a level of care equal to ci, 
which is less than the optimal level of care, cd. (Once the 
employer has the rights, the cost of buying the rights is a fixed 
cost. That is true even if annual purchase is required.) Thus, 
again, the optimal deterrence level of care cd would not be 
adopted. Furthermore, no secondary market would ever 
develop. 
Other arrangements also lead to similar results. Suppose 
that potential victims have no insurance and buyers compete 
by promising insurance plus a lump sum. Persons in the 
secondary market could afford to bid a lump sum up to: 
 
Ls = p(cd)D - p(cd)I. 
 
The employer could bid a lump sum representing the 
differences in costs between obtaining the rights and not, 
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Lt = [cd + p(cd)D] - [ci + p(ci)I]. 
 
Note that 
 
Lt - Ls = [cd + p(cd)D] - [ci + p(ci)I] - [p(cd)D - p(cd)I] 
= [cd + p(cd)I] - [ci + p(ci)I]. 
 
The above expression is positive since ci minimizes c + 
p(c)I. Thus, the employer could adopt a standing offer of: 
 
Ls + 0.5{[cd + p(cd)I] - [ci + p(ci)I]}. 
 
Given this offer, the employer would always win the bid. 
Furthermore, the employer would end up adopting a level of 
care equal to ci, which is less than cd. (Again, once the 
employer has the rights, the cost of buying the rights is a fixed 
cost, which is true even if annual purchase is required.) Thus, 
the optimal deterrence level of care cd would not be adopted. 
Furthermore, no secondary market would ever develop. 
It is not necessary that the same outside entity both buys 
the claims and provides the insurance although there are 
reasons not included in the model to believe that this will 
happen. For example, if we consider the optimal level of 
resources spent in enforcing the claim the reasoning would be 
as follows. Suppose that there are two entities; A provides 
insurance for employees and B has purchased the unmatured 
claims from the employees. Suppose B spends z amount in 
enforcing the claims and that this affects the probability of an 
accident. Now suppose that there is a merger between A and B. 
The optimal amount spent enforcing the claims goes up since 
the marginal benefits of enforcing claims and reducing the 
probability of an accident increases. Although we have not 
made the argument in a formal mathematical sense, the 
reasoning indicates that it is likely that the firm providing 
insurance will also purchase the unmatured tort claims. 
 
Liability-Limiting Agreements 
 
Consider the case of an insurance company that provides 
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insurance to the employees and that has purchased the claims 
(as part of an insurance package) from employees. It should be 
clear from the above discussion that the employer could afford 
to pay the insurer a fee not to enforce the full extent of the 
claims. For example, the employer could offer the insurance 
company a fee not to make any claims. In this case, the 
employer could reduce caution to zero. The maximum fee that 
the employer could offer for this is therefore: 
 
cd + p(cd)D.(3) 
 
The minimum fee that the insurance company would be 
willing to accept is the loss of revenue due to suit, plus the 
increased cost of insuring the employees, given that the 
employer will now adopt zero caution: 
 
p(cd)D + [p(0)I - p(cd)I].(4) 
 
If we subtract expression (4) from expression (3) we will 
get the size of the zone of potential agreement: 
 
[cd + p(cd)D] - [p(cd)D + p(0)I - p(cd)I]. 
 
The question is whether the resulting expression is 
positive. If it is positive then some agreement is possible. We 
can rewrite it as follows: 
 
cd + p(cd)I - [0 + p(0)I]. 
 
Whether this is positive depends on the function c + p(c)I. 
This function is minimized at ci, which is greater than zero, but 
less than cd. We cannot tell whether the above expression is 
positive or negative. There does, however, exist the possibility 
that it is positive and, therefore, it is possible that an 
agreement could lead to the adoption of zero care. 
Other agreements are also possible. For example, to find 
the most beneficial agreement to both parties, but not 
necessarily to the employees, we note that they could agree 
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that the insurance company limits its damages to X. Then, the 
benefit of the agreement to the employer over no agreement 
would be 
 
[cd + p(cd)D] - [cx + p(cx)X] - F. 
 
Where cx minimizes c + p(c)X, and F is the agreed upon 
fee, then the benefit to the insurer would be 
 
F - [p(cd)D - p(cx)X] - [p(cx)I - p(cd)I]. 
 
The expression in the first bracket represents lost 
collections from the employer and the second bracket 
represents increased payouts to the employees. Adding these 
benefits together, and simplifying the expression, yields: 
 
[cd + p(cd)I] - [cx + p(cx)I] 
 
Note that X has disappeared from the expression. 
However, it is X that determines cx since cx is the c that 
minimizes c + p(c)X. The cx that minimizes expression (5) is 
just ci, since ci minimizes c +p(c)I therefore it follows that X=I. 
That is the maximum bargaining surplus generated by the 
insurance company, limiting its claim to I. In this case, the 
employer will adopt a level of care equal to ci. Given this, the 
maximum fee that the employer will pay for such a limitation 
is: 
 
[cd + p(cd)D] - [ci + p(ci) I], 
 
and the minimum fee that the employer will accept is: 
 
[p(cd)D - p(ci)I] + [p(ci)I - p(cd)I]. 
 
The bargaining surplus is the difference, which is, after 
simplification: 
 
[cd + p(cd)I]  - [ci  + p(ci)I]. 
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This is always positive since ci minimizes ci + p(ci)I. The 
result is that there are strong incentives for a deal to be struck 
and for the level of care to be set at ci. That is, the employer 
will be underdeterred. Thus, we would not allow such deals to 
be made. 
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